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ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, the accounting profession has witnessed the 
commercialisation of audit firms through offering of non-audit 
services (i.e. business consultancy services) to their audit client. 
Regulators and stakeholders have placed a great concern on the 
potential threat of commercialization of audit services on perceived 
auditor independence. This study reports the effects of the joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services (NAS) and the type of NAS 
on perceived auditor independence. The main findings suggest that 
auditor independence is perceived to be compromised when audit and 
NAS were jointly offered by audit firms. However, when there exist 
proper segregation of duties in audit firms that offer both services, the 
perception changed.
Keywords: Non-audit services (NAS), auditor independence, 
segregation of duties
INTRODUCTION
Evidence of audit failures documented worldwide have led to major criticism of the 
auditing professions’ independence and exposed its implication on shareholders’ 
and stakeholders’ interests (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; 
Krishnan, 2005).  External auditors are expected not only be independent but more 
importantly must be seen to be independent when examining and attesting clients’ 
financial statements (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004; Sori and Mohamad, 2009a, 2009b; 
Stevenson, 2002, p. 155)1.  Auditors are expected to decide on reporting strategies 
* Corresponding author: Email: ZMS@econ.upm.edu.my
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author(s) of this paper.
1 Fearnley and Beattie (2004) argued that independence in appearance is important because 
“independent behaviour (i.e. independence in fact) is unobservable” (p. 121).
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without any influence from their clients’ management (Chandler and Edwards, 
1996; Cullinan, 2004).
The globalisation of the accounting profession and the subsequent increase 
in competitiveness and the need to survive  has forced  many auditing firms to 
diversify into non-audit services and has created ‘the multidisciplinary nature of 
large audit firms’ (Brierley and Gwilliam, 2003, p. 435).  These multidisciplinary 
firms offer audit and non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients and has become a 
major concern on the potential auditor independence (Craswell, 1999; Muhamad 
Sori and Mohamad, 2007; Quick and Warming-Rasmussen, 2005) and substantial 
amount of empirical evidence has been documented in identifying the nature and 
extent of this threat in developed countries (e.g. Abbott et al. 2001; Beattie and 
Fearnley, 2002; Brandon et al., 2004; Canning and Gwilliam, 1999; Chung and 
Kallapur, 2003; Ezzamel et al., 2002; Fearnley and Beattie, 2004; Felix et al., 
2005; Frankel et al., 2002; Jenkins and Krawczyk, 2001; Quick and Warming-
Rasmussen, 2005; Raghunandan, 2003) and in less developed countries (e.g. Gul 
and Yap, 1984; Teoh and Lim, 1996).  The evidence suggests that the joint provision 
of audit and NAS raise the risk of client retention due to economic incentives, and 
the tendency to compromise on auditing quality and independence  (Beck et al., 
1988; DeAngelo, 1981; Frankel et al., 2002; Simunic, 1984).
The main question that arises when auditors provide both audit and NAS is 
whether the auditors are able to conduct their audits impartially, without being 
concerned about losing or failing to gain additional services, and the subsequent 
economic implications for the audit firm (Lee, 1993, p. 103).  In fact, the provision 
of NAS has the potential to create economic bonding from the significant amount 
of fees received from clients (Simunic, 1984; Beck et al. 1988).  The economic 
bonding between audit firms and their clients would influence auditor independence. 
It may be that the level of client pressure would increase and auditor becomes less 
concerned with the quality of internal audits. 
The main concern is the ability of auditors to objectively examine their clients’ 
financial statements while at the same time receiving lucrative NAS fees from the 
same client.  The joint provision of audit and NAS would create a potential conflict 
of interest either consciously or unconsciously, and audit client would feel closely 
associated with the auditor and expect them to compromise their independence 
at the behest of the management’s requirement.  Flint (1988) pointed out, “the 
auditors may become unduly sympathetic to a directorial or managerial attitude 
or interpretation of events, or the work may involve the creation of systems and 
information rather than assessing the adequacy of the systems and information 
which have been created by the directors or managers” (p. 81).
This paper examines the effects of the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services and the provision of different types of non-audit services on perceived 
auditor independence from the perspective of senior managers of audit firms, loan 
officers and public listed companies in Malaysia.  A good understanding on auditor 
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independence from this part of the world is important and perhaps will shed some 
light on the effect of globalization of auditing services on the independence of 
external auditors in the local audit market.
The paper is organised into five sections.  The following section reviews the 
literature on joint provision of audit and non-audit services.  Section three discusses 
the information collection and analysis procedures and the fourth section presents 
the findings.  The conclusions and implications of the findings are summarized in 
the final section. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Research on the choice of NAS tends to focus on the selection of service providers, 
such as from the company’s auditor or elsewhere, and if audit and NAS are jointly 
provided by the company’s auditor, whether proper segregation of duties exists. 
Research findings on the association of joint provision of audit and NAS and auditor 
independence  are inconclusive (Ashbaugh, 2004; Brandon et al., 2004; Chung 
and Kallapur, 2003; DeFond et al., 2002; Frankel et al., 2002; Geiger and Rama, 
2003; Kleinman et al., 1998; Reynolds et al., 2004). 
The proponents of joint provision of audit and NAS contend that auditor 
independence would not be affected but would improve audit quality (Antle et al., 
1997).  Hartley and Ross (1972) found that only 6% of their respondents believed 
that the provision of NAS posed a significant threat to independence.  Firth (1980) 
showed that the provision of NAS was considered to be only a minor threat to auditor 
independence.  In a study of financial disclosure of NAS, Glezen and Millar (1985) 
discovered that stockholders were unconcerned about the joint provision of audit 
and NAS adversely influencing auditor independence.  Also, it was claimed that the 
auditor’s knowledge of the client company would be improved by the provision of 
NAS, resulting in increased objectivity (knowledge spillover) and independence 
(Goldman and Barlev, 1974; Wallman 1996).
It was argued that the dependence of company management on the audit firm 
would be higher in cases where the auditors are providing NAS to their clients, and 
the client management would have an interest in not losing their auditor (Goldman 
and Barlev, 1974).  In a study of the profiles of NAS purchased by US companies, 
Palmrose (1988) found that the majority of the sampled companies sourced NAS 
from their auditors rather than from other suppliers.  These results indicate that the 
respondents were not concerned about the perceived negative impact to auditor 
independence.  Gul (1989) studied the perceptions of bankers in New Zealand 
and found that the effect of provision of NAS was significantly and positively 
associated with auditor independence.  Moizer (1997) pointed out that the greater 
the audit firm’s economic interests, the greater will be client’s dependence.  Hussey 
(1999) reported that the majority of the UK finance directors that participated in 
his study suggested that joint provision of audit and NAS to audit clients should 
continue to be allowed. 
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In Malaysia, Gul and Yap (1984) reported that only a small number of the 
shareholders and auditors that participated in their study believed that NAS 
provision increased their confidence in auditor independence.  Teoh and Lim (1996) 
found that the provision of NAS was ranked as the second most important factor 
that undermines auditor independence. 
The joint provision of audit and NAS would create ‘economies of scope’2; 
Arrunada (1999, p. 165) pointed out that joint provision of audit and NAS would 
reduce overall costs, raises the technical quality of auditing, enhance competition, 
and need not prejudice auditor independence or the quality of non-audit services, 
which would ultimately increase auditor independence (Goldman and Barlev, 1974; 
Wallman 1996).  Based on the standard organisation analysis, Arrunada (1999, p. 
169) showed that cost savings gained from the joint provision of audit and NAS 
will be transferred to customers as a decrease in price in both markets, and also 
that the provision of NAS would ‘result in an increase in client- and firm-specific 
assets’ (p. 168), where firm-specific assets would ‘always have a positive effect on 
independence’ (p. 168).  This argument is supported by Grout et al. (1994), who 
argued that permitting auditors to perform joint services would reduce auditors’ 
dependence on a single client and encourage them to diversify as a consequence. 
Opponents to the joint provision of audit and NAS claimed that auditors would 
not perform their audit services objectively and that joint provision would impair 
perceived independence (see, for example, Brandon et al., 2004; Frankel et al., 
2002; Glezen and Miller, 1985; Jenkins and Krawczyk, 2001; Raghunandan, 2003) 
because ultimately they would be auditing their own work or acting as management 
(SEC, 2001), and management’s power over the auditor could be increased due to 
auditors’ reliance on fees received (Canning and Gwilliam, 1999).  Thus, it may 
influence “their mental attitude, impartiality and objectivity, and independence of 
thought and action” (Flint, 1988, p. 82). 
Provision of Non-Audit Services
The previous section documented inconclusive findings on the issue of impact of 
joint provision of audit and NAS on auditor independence.  It is expected that public 
accounting firms should have the maximum discretion to develop and provide audit 
and NAS to their clients (Mikol and Standish, 1998).  However, Mitchell et al. 
(1993) rejected this idea and believed that the joint provision of audit and NAS to 
audit clients would cause unfair competition due to the use of audit services to sell 
2 There are two types of economies of scope, namely ‘knowledge spillover’ and ‘contractual economies 
of scope’ (Arrunada, 1999, pp. 75-77).  Knowledge spillover takes place when two different services 
involve elements of the same information set and/or the same professional qualifications.  Contractual 
economies of scope happen due to the provision of professional services with associated high transactions 
costs because of informational asymmetry between client and supplier.  Joint provision of services 
diminishes the cost of seeking a credible consultant and the cost of warranting contractual performance.
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NAS, and suggested that auditors should be banned from offering both services to 
the same client.  Similarly, Flint (1988) believed that auditors would have some 
form of predisposition towards a favourable assessment because the firm as a whole 
was involved in the creation, development or consultation of the NAS.
As an alternative to a total ban on provision of NAS to audit clients, Arrunada 
(1999) recommended the use of different divisions that are responsible for each 
series of services as a safeguard to maintain independence.  These divisions are 
organized as profit centres within audit firms that have their own management and 
exert little if any influence over the audit partners’ evaluation or compensation 
process.  In fact, the idea is justifiable in the UK environment, where Lennox (1999) 
found a weakly positives significant association between audit qualifications and 
disclosed NAS and construed that the ‘current UK policy may be justified in not 
banning NAS.  This conclusion is strengthened if policy-makers take account of 
the economies of scope that may accrue from allowing the joint provision of audit 
and NAS’ (p.250).  Consistently, Hillison and Kennelley (1988) believed that 
the approach would enhance auditor independence, especially when appropriate 
safeguards are in place, such as ‘Chinese walls’ (Mikol and Standish, 1998, p. 546)3. 
The potential threat to auditor independence is lessened when there is a 
separation of personnel performing NAS and audit services (Pany and Reckers, 
1984).  Similarly, Lowe et al. (1999), Lowe and Pany (1995) and Swanger and 
Chewning (2001) discovered significant positive associations between auditor 
independence and joint provision of NAS by staff separation (segregation of 
duties).  Also, Canning and Gwilliam (1999) found that only a small percentage 
of their respondents expressed concern about the threat to independence when 
separate departments provide joint services.  However, the option of separate 
workforces to perform audit and non-audit services is only possible if the audit 
firm has enough resources, and smaller firms may not have such an opportunity for 
specialisation.  However, Quick and Warming-Rasmussen (2005) found that joint 
3 Section 48 (2) (h) of the UK’s Financial Services Act 1986 illustrates Chinese Walls as “procedures 
for restricting flows of information within a firm to ensure that information which is confidential to one 
department is not improperly communicated to any other department within the firm.  They are widely 
used in the financial services sector to manage or avoid conflicts between the duties owed to different 
customers, or conflicts between the firm’s interests and the duties owed to customers, which arise out 
of the different activities of the component parts of the firm on different sides of the wall”.  On the 
other hand, the Consultation Paper on Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules the Law Commission 
(1992) (Law Com. No. 124) describes Chinese Walls as normally involving some combination of the 
following organisational arrangements: (i) the physical separation of the various departments in order 
to insulate them from each other; (ii) an educational programme, normally recurring, to emphasis 
the importance of not improperly or inadvertently divulging confidential information; (iii) strict and 
carefully defined procedures for dealing with a situation where it is felt that the wall should be crossed 
and the maintaining of proper records where this occurs; (iv) monitoring by compliance officers of the 
effectiveness of the wall; (v) disciplinary sanctions where there has been a breach of the wall (House 
of Lords, 1998).
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provision of audit and NAS by staff from separate departments did not improve 
perceived independence.
Realising the obstacles faced by small firms, Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p. 230) 
suggested three alternatives: (i) forbid/prohibit small firms from performing auditing 
services on the conjecture that they cannot appropriately perform both on impartial 
basis and that auditing is much less likely to be a major source of revenue to small 
firms; (ii) require each small firm to select which of the two fields of specialisation 
it will take on; or (iii) permit small firms to take on work as they do at present, 
performing a variety of services for their clients.  Due to lack of incentive for a 
stringent approach at that time, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) favoured the third course 
of action, because small firms rarely undertake audit duties for companies that have 
public interest and usually perform audits for small businesses at the request of 
bankers or creditors that have good knowledge about the credibility and reliability 
of local accounting practitioners.  They further asserted that the drawback of 
segregation of duties for small firms is that it will ‘make it more difficult to service 
their clients and others with no substantial offsetting benefits resulting from such 
restriction’ (p. 230). 
In Malaysia, Arens et al. (1999) revealed that Big Four firms audited more 
than 60% of listed companies and that a large majority of medium and small firms 
serve unlisted companies with a lack of public interest.  However in developed 
markets, Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p. 230) suggested that ‘as soon as a given client 
becomes of sufficient size that there is a substantial public interest in its audited 
financial statements, . . . a strict separation of auditing and other services should 
be effected, if not by a division within the accounting firm, then by employment 
of separate accountants for the two types of services’ (p. 230).
Hillison and Kennelley (1988) had recommended three additional alternatives 
to a total prohibition of NAS provision to audit clients: (i) offer NAS to non-audit 
clients only; (ii) prohibit certain types of NAS; or (iii) permit all types of NAS 
with full disclosure requirements.  They alleged that although prohibiting all NAS 
would produce the greatest positive impact on perceptions of auditor independence, 
it would be the most drastic action.  They favoured permitting all types of NAS 
with full disclosure because it would create the least resistance from practitioners, 
avoid companies’ rejection on disclosure, and it would possibly be effective in 
monitoring audit clients’ acquisition of NAS.  Although a conflict of interest might 
arise from the joint provision of audit and non-audit services to audit clients, it 
might be inappropriate to prohibit accounting firms from offering non-audit services 
if this issue is observed from the ‘business efficiency’ perspective (Chandler and 
Edwards, 1996, p.26).  Fearnley and Beattie (2004) reviewed prior studies and 
concluded that there is no need for total prohibition of joint provision of audit 
and NAS, as the dilemma could be overcome by the following suggestion: “more 
transparency about how firms manage the conflicts of interest that NAS provision 
creates; whether audit partners are rewarded for earning NAS; and the nature of 
the NAS being provided” (p. 124).  Additionally, audit committees should play 
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their role in approving the provision of NAS.  Indeed, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in the US and Bursa Malaysian Berhad (BMB) in Malaysia have 
required public companies to disclose the joint provision of audit and NAS in their 
financial statements, where the disclosure would “shed light on the independence 
of public companies’ auditors” (SEC, 2000c). 
In a study of bank loan decisions, Firth (1981) discovered that smaller loans 
were granted for companies that showed joint provision of audit and NAS in their 
financial statements than companies that did not have such information.  Jenkins and 
Krawczyk (2001) found that joint provision of audit and NAS had a positive impact 
on the perceptions of auditor independence, and also discovered that the disclosure 
of the amount of NAS and audit fees was preferred by investors.  Similarly 
Raghunadan (2003) lent support to the SEC’s argument that disclosure of NAS 
fees could influence shareholders’ voting decisions, observing that shareholders 
did not consider that the provision of NAS would threaten auditor independence 
even if the companies purchased very large non-audit services from their auditors.
Schleifer and Shockley (1990) evidenced that the other two options to a total 
ban on NAS, as identified by Hillison and Kennelley (1988), would improve the 
perceived independence of auditors.  Similarly, Gul and Yap (1984) found that the 
majority of Malaysian auditors, managers, bankers and shareholders agreed that 
disclosure of NAS fees would enhance perceived auditor independence.  Also, 
Scheiner (1984) provided evidence that disclosure of NAS reduced the purchase 
of personnel services from the incumbent auditor.  Consistently, Schleifer and 
Shockley (1990) found that over half of the Big Eight auditors and financial 
analysts and around a third of non-Big Eight CPAs and loan officers opposed the 
policy to ban auditors from providing joint audit and NAS.  The majority of the 
Big Eight auditors and financial analysts believed that disclosure of NAS would 
not enhance auditor independence, while the majority of financial analysts, non-Big 
Eight CPAs and loan officers have conflicting views.  Lee (1993, p. 109) stressed 
that perceived auditor independence would only improve if the joint provision of 
audit and NAS was either completely prohibited or publicly disclosed.  However, 
Canning and Gwilliam (1999) found that the threat to auditor independence would 
be minimal when the provision of NAS was to non-audit clients only i.e. ban NAS 
to audit clients.
However, Flint (1988) disagreed with the suggestion that an alternative 
“organisational and constitutional structure” (p. 82) should be created for audit 
firms to provide joint audit and NAS, and argued that the potential conflict of 
interests would still exist.  Sherer and Kent (1983, p. 27) maintained that ultimately, 
auditors would be examining their own work and asking for explanations from a 
member of the client’s staff in whose appointment process they had been involved 
(i.e. rendering human resource services), and argued that the joint provision of 
audit and NAS must be prohibited.  Also, Flint (1988) argued that auditors might 
find themselves at a point where they had to decide whether to criticise or to take 
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exception to a situation where the firm had a direct interest in the outcome of the 
audit that conflicted with their role as consultants.  Indeed, there would be an 
“economic bond or a legal bond – particularly a bond of joint responsibility and 
liability” (Flint, 1988, p. 83).  He argued that the firm as a whole would receive 
‘net benefit’ from the NAS work brought in by the audit division, and as a result 
the audit function would be unduly affected by “a general directorial or managerial 
point of view” (Flint, 1988, p. 83).
Types of NAS
The provision of selected types of NAS to audit client might threaten perceived 
auditor independence.  To overcome this threat, the US regulators adopted 
prescriptive approach that outline nine types of non-audit services that inconsistent 
with auditor independence.  These services are bookkeeping or other services 
related to the audit client’s accounting records or financial statements, financial 
information systems design and implementation, appraisal or valuation services or 
fairness opinions, actuarial services, internal audit services, management functions, 
human resources, broker-dealer services and legal services. 
Most of the studies were conducted in the US and similar research in other parts 
of the world started in the last two decades.  Titard (1971) investigates the impact 
on perceived auditor independence when auditor provides 33 specific categories of 
NAS to audit client and found that more than 20% of the respondents agreed that 
mergers and acquisitions, executive recruitment, policy determination, personnel 
appraisal and/or selection and executive and wage incentive plans services could 
threat auditor independence.  However, only small percentage (i.e. 10% to 20%) 
of the respondents believed that the five services should be banned.  Lavin (1976; 
1977) found that the provision of accounting services and the maintenance of 
executive payroll (limited accounting services) would impair perceptions of auditor 
independence.  Wide-ranging accounting services were considered by less than half 
of the respondents to threat independence.  Goldman and Barlev (1974) argued that 
the provision of non-routine audit services could enhance auditor independence 
because the auditor’s value to and power over the client company increases.  Pany 
and Reckers (1983) found that service type and magnitude of the services as highly 
significant factors to threat auditor independence, where less routine duty would 
give rise to higher self-review threat. 
Pany and Reckers (1984) found no significant difference in perceptions of 
auditor independence when auditor provides executive recruiting, actuarial services, 
redesign of an accounting system, market feasibility studies, independent board of 
director recruiting, purchase acquisition assistance, and client employment of firm 
employees to audit client.  In a study on the impact on auditor independence when 
auditor provides acquisition investigation, design of accounting systems, assistance 
with accounting decisions, and executive search and hiring of CEO, Bartlett 
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(1993) found that the provision of executive search threaten the perception of 
independence and assistance with accounting decisions enhance the perceptions 
of independence. 
Lowe, Geiger and Pany (1999) discover that auditor independence would 
mostly safeguard when the company’s CPA firm employ separate staff members 
to execute the internal auditing services.  In a more recent study, Swanger 
and Chewning (2001) investigate the influence of five different internal audits 
outsourcing arrangements on perceived independence of 250 financial analysts and 
found that in the event of staff separation, perceptions are not adversely affected. 
Respondents did not comprehend a difference between partial and full outsourcing. 
Mauldin (2003) found that internal audit outsourcing and mergers and acquisition 
as a threat to auditor independence.
In the UK, Beattie et al. (1996) found that majority of NAS supplied by auditors 
is accounting services that facilitate listed companies to conform to the legal and 
regulatory requirements rather than management consultancy.  They concluded 
that it would be beneficial to show the split or detail of NAS services offered in 
disclosure of financial statement.  In German, Dykxhoorn and Sinning (1981) 
evidenced that more than half German auditors thought that auditor independence 
would be harmed when auditor provide extensive accounting services.  However, 
three-third of German auditors viewed that the auditor’s independence would not 
be harmed with more limited accounting service provision.  Three services were 
identified to affect auditor independence namely extensive accounting services, 
limited accounting services and EDP provision.  In Canada, Lindsay et al. (1987) 
investigate the effect three specific types of service namely preparation of accounts, 
executive search and accounting systems design.  They found that accounting 
systems design was considered as the least threat to auditor independence and 
around a third of the respondents considered the other two services makes auditor 
dependent on client. 
COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION
This study was conducted in two stages.  The first stage involved the use of a 
postal questionnaire to seek information from auditors, loan officers and senior 
managers of public listed companies on the impact of joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services on auditor independence.  The questionnaire was pilot-tested 
to increase the relevance and validity of the information sourced.  The second 
stage entailed a series of interviews with senior managers of audit firms, banks 
and publicly listed companies to solicit more detailed information on the issue of 
interest.  Auditors were selected because they are the main subjects of the issue of 
interest that provide certification and/or information credibility assessment to the 
stakeholders (Humphrey, 1997).  Furthermore, Flint (1988, p. 76) pointed that the 
person to whom the audit reports is addressed and the person that are subjected to 
audit have a direct interest in the audit outcome.  Gul (1991, p. 165) argued that bank 
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officers are relatively sophisticated financial statement users who could be expected 
to understand the importance of auditor independence.  Finally, the manager is the 
agent of the principal, who conducts business on behalf of the principal and, hence, 
requires a monitoring mechanism (i.e. an auditor) to report on their performance 
(see Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and on this basis, senior managers’ perceptions 
of auditor independence are valuable to this study.
The total questionnaires distributed and responded are reported in Table 1, 
where 31%, 44% and 36% of the questionnaires were returned from auditors, loan 
officers and senior managers of public listed companies respectively. 4
An analysis was carried out of the designation of the respondents and details 
of the findings are tabulated in Table 2.5  The majority of the respondents held 
relatively senior positions in their respective organisations: 46% of the responding 
auditors were line managers, while 47% and 43% of the loan officer and corporate 
management groups were senior managers, the remainder being the first line 
of management and the chief executives of the respective organisations.  The 
respondents were responsible for the auditing, accounting and finance function and 
their seniority indicates the validity of the information provided.
4 It is well recognised in the literature that responses to mail questionnaires are generally poor, and it 
is a common phenomenon to see return percentages as low as between 30 to 50% (Wallace and Mellor, 
1988, p. 132).  Indeed, the possibility of occurrence of non-response bias arises when some of the 
survey sample failed to return the questionnaire and the data may consequently turn out to be invalid. 
Hence, in order to ensure the reliability and validity of the data, an attempt to diagnose the presence of 
non-response bias is essential (see Bartlett and Chandler, 1997; Mallin and Ow-Yong, 1998).  Based 
on the technique recommended by Oppenheim (1966) and Wallace and Mellor (1988), the first 20 
questionnaires were compared with the last 20 questionnaires.  The Mann-Whitney test was employed 
as a statistical tool to investigate the differences.  It was found that there was no significant difference 
between the 20 early and 20 late responses, implying the absence of non-response bias.
5 Another source of bias in survey-type studies is self-selection bias (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002; 
Oppenheim, 1992; Whitehead, 1991).  The bias might arise from the fact that “people are more likely 
to respond to a questionnaire if they see items which interest them” (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002) and 
“they may try to ‘respond’ extra-well” to the questions (Oppenheim, 1992, p.30).  Indeed, self-selection 
bias is a result of a pre-existing interest factor, and it is more serious than the non-representative 
nature of the population due to the existence of many unknown factors (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002; 
Oppenheim, 1992).  It may be that the people who responded to the questionnaires have dissimilar 
characteristics to those who did not reply.  Although no specific approach to identify self-selection bias 
has been documented, this study employed two techniques.  First, two groups of control and experimental 
respondents were developed (Oppenheim, 1992).  The control group consisted of respondents with 
more than 10 years’ experience, while the experimental group comprised of respondents with less than 
10 years’ experience.  Using the Mann-Whitney test, responses from both groups of respondents from 
all three classifications (i.e. auditors, loan officers and senior managers of public listed companies) 
were examined, and it was found that the distribution of responses of the two groups in all respondent 
classifications was not significantly different, indicating that the effect of self-selection response bias was 
minimal or non-existent.  Second, since this study employed both questionnaire and interview survey 
approaches, the results of interview survey tend to confirm the questionnaire survey in all variables 
examined.  The consistency of responses in both approaches indicates minimal or non-existent self-
selection response bias.
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Table 1 Analysis of responses by respondent’s category
Category
Total 
questionnaires 
issued
Usable 
responses 
received pre-
reminder
Usable 
responses 
received post-
reminder 1
Usable 
responses 
received post-
reminder 2
Total usable 
response
Total usable 
response  
rate
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency %
Audit Firms 300 25 30 38 93 31
Financial 
Institutions
200 32 28 27 87 44
Public Listed 
Companies
300 42 16 49 107 36
Total 800 99 74 114 287 36
Table 2 Profile of postal survey respondents analysed by category of employment
Auditors Loan Officers Senior Managers
Status Number % Status Number % Status Number %
Audit Senior 38 41 Officer 34 39 Financial Accountant 36 34
Line Manager 43 46 Senior Manager 41 47 Senior Manager 46 43
Senior Manager 12 13 Chief Executive 12 14 Chief Executive 25 23
Total 93 100 87 100 107 100
From the prespective of work experience of respondents, information 
summarized in Table 3 shows that more than 80% of the respondents had more than 
5 years’ experience in their respective functions.  The length of service indicates 
respondents familiarity with their job functions and changes in the accounting and 
auditing profession. 
Table 3 Analysis showing the period of employment of respondents 
participating in the interview survey
Level of Experience
Auditors Loan Officers
Senior Manager 
of Public Listed 
Companies
Senior Manager 
of Regulatory 
Bodies
Number % Number % Number % Number %
Under 5 years 1 8 1 6 0 0 2 29
Between 6 and 10 years 3 23 3 18 3 18 0 0
Between 11 and 15 years 5 38 5 29 6 35 4 57
Between 16 and 25 years 2 16 7 41 5 29 0 0
More than 25 years 2 15 1 6 3 18 1 14
Total 13 100 17 100 17 100 7 100
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The interviews help to consolidate and clarify the information gathered from 
the questionnaire survey.  A detailed analysis of the period of employment of the 
respondents participating in the interview stage is provided in Table 3.
Table 3 shows that vast majority of the interviewees had more than 5 years 
of experience.  Hence, the opinions provided by interviewees are expected to be 
reliable.
FINDINGS
Mode of NAS Provision
Respondents were asked to provide their perceptions on six literature based 
(Arrunada (1999), Canning and Gwilliam (1999))mode of provision of non-audit 
services; (i) provision of non audit services by audit engagement staff, (ii) provision 
of non audit services by staff from separate department, (iii) provision of non audit 
services by staff from different entities; (iv) audit firms are prohibited providing 
non-audit services to audit client; (v) audit firms are completely banned from 
providing non-audit services; and (vi) audit firms providing non-audit services with 
disclosure of such provision in client financial statements.  Besides the above issues, 
respondents were asked for the reasons underlying for the support of or objection 
to the joint provision of audit and non-audit services to audit client. 
Provision of NAS by Audit Personnel
It was found that 76% of the auditors, all of the loan officers and 91% of the senior 
managers of public listed companies agreed with the statement that the provision 
of NAS to audit clients by audit engagement staff threatens auditor independence 
(refer to Table 4).  Although there is strong agreement from the auditors, this is 
less than that expressed by the loan officers and senior managers of public listed 
companies, and this reflects on the unwillingness of a minority of the auditor 
respondents to acknowledge any problems that the joint provision of audit and 
non-audit services by staff from the same department.  The result is consistent with 
a study of Irish users of financial statements by Canning and Gwilliam (1999).
The interview survey revealed that the majority of the auditors (77%), loan 
officers (88%) and senior managers of public listed companies (82%) agreed that 
auditor independence would be threatened if the same personnel provides joint 
provision of audit and non-audit services.  The interviewees were concerned with 
the ability of the auditors to behave independently and professionally and to resist 
management pressure due to their dependence on income from both services.  The 
interviewees disclosed that auditors’ financial dependence on the client would 
create a tendency to threaten auditor independence and would lead the auditors to 
think in the client’s way. 
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The interviews also disclosed that auditors tend to succumb to client pressure 
when there is a lack of monitoring activities.  In fact, some of the interviewees 
noted that auditor independence would be threatened if they were to gain more 
knowledge of various aspects of the client’s business from their regular review 
of the business in audit and non-audit services.  Thus, they would be familiar 
with the system’s weaknesses and as a consequence expose to manipulation.  The 
interviewees disclosed that there is a need for different people to independently 
scrutinise the audit and non-audit work.
Interestingly, the majority of the loan officers (80%) pointed out that they did 
not take into account the provision of non-audit services to audit client in their loan 
making decisions.A manager of the corporate loan division of a top bank noted:
In analysing the financial statement for loan processing, we actually 
do not look at this criterion.  Perhaps it is good to know the way they 
operate.  But, our knowledge is limited to the information disclosed by 
the company.
Only a small number of interviewees (i.e. 23% of the auditors; 12% of the loan 
officers; 18% of the senior managers of public listed companies) disagreed with 
the statement that joint provision of audit and non-audit services would threaten 
auditor independence and argued that auditors are professional enough to perform 
their duties independently without any bias.  It may be the case that auditors are 
bound by their professional ethics and will not compromise their ethical standards 
for the sake of their business.  The occurrence of misbehaviour among auditor was 
said to originate from a small and insignificant number of ‘bogus’ accountants. 
Indeed, the large majority of the auditors were said to adhere to the spirit of the 
rules and regulations on auditor independence.
Provision of NAS by Staff from Separate Department
As an alternative to joint provision of audit and NAS by audit personnel, it was 
suggested that the provision of these services should be performed by staff from 
separate departments.  The majority of the auditors (51%), loan officers (42%) and 
senior managers of public listed companies (58%) disagreed with the statement 
that auditor independence would be threatened if the provision of NAS to audit 
clients were to be undertaken by staff from different departments within the same 
firm (Table 4), and this reflect the respondents’ confidence in the safeguards of 
auditor independence by splitting the provision of audit and NAS into separate 
departments, which is consistent with Canning and Gwilliam (1999) and Pany and 
Reckers (1984).  Indeed, the separation of personnel is one of the alternatives to a 
total ban on the joint provision of audit and NAS (Hillison and Kennelly, 1988). 
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In the interview survey, the vast majority of the auditors (85%), loan officers 
(71%) and senior managers of public listed companies (59%) indicated that auditor 
independence would not be threatened if the provision of audit and non-audit 
services to audit client was performed by staff from different departments, which is 
consistent with the result of questionnaire survey.  The interviews disclosed that this 
mode of NAS provision would allow segregation of duties in monitoring activities, 
widely known as the ‘Chinese Wall’ (Mikol and Standish, 1998).  It was believed 
that different partners would handle the different departments, which would result 
in greater monitoring activities and mean that the audit division might not lose 
sight of the material issues.  As a manager of a Big Four audit firm pointed out:
You may not detect the errors that you made yourself.  By having different 
departments, at least someone else is looking into your work, rather 
than you performing both of the services.
In fact, some of the interviewees argued that auditors are still good candidates 
for provision of NAS to their audit clients, due to their understanding and knowledge 
of clients’ business operations, which would speed up the process and allow them 
to deliver better quality services.  A chief executive of a merchant bank remarked:
I think it is good to have separate departments that perform the services 
rather than one person wearing two hats, but ultimately it goes back to 
the people, their professionalism and their characters. 
Also, some of the interviewees indicated that this kind of arrangement would 
ease information exchange, which may not be achieved if NAS are provided by 
other firms.  Perhaps, audit firms could effectively utilise their personnel who 
have a good understanding of the client’s business to speed up the process and 
subsequently produce a high quality financial statement. 
However, a small minority of the interviewees disclosed that the provision of 
non-audit services by a separate department would threaten auditor independence. 
They were sceptical about the ability of audit firms to ensure total segregation of 
duties, and suggested that most audit firms would try to achieve economies of scale 
by allocating idle staff to any department within the same firm that required their 
services.  Also, some of the interviewees expressed concern about the ability of 
auditors to act professionally and differentiate between friendship and responsibility 
to the general public.  They indicated that partners in the same audit firm that 
perform audit and non-audit services are closely connected.
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Provision of NAS by Staff from Separate Entity
As shown in Table 4, 74 percent of the auditors, 85 percent of the loan officers and 
58 percent of the senior managers of public listed companies indicated that auditor 
independence would not be threatened when the provision of NAS to audit client 
is done by a separate entity where the auditors have an interest.  Perhaps, the attitude 
demonstrated by the respondents in this issue indicates their support in the “Chinese 
Wall” concept that received much attention among Malaysian professionals 
recently.  The increase in respondents support in this issue indicate the objective 
to segregate job functions between audit and NAS would be more attainable when 
exist separate entities to handle different responsibilities as compared to separation 
of department.
The interview survey indicated that as many as 92% of the auditors, 94% 
of the loan officers and 82% of the senior managers of public listed companies 
interviewed agreed that the provision of audit and non-audit services by separate 
entities would safeguard auditor independence.  The interviews disclosed that 
this mode of provision of NAS would safeguard auditor independence due to the 
structure of audit and non-audit firms, which would ensure greater transparency of 
financial reporting (i.e. Chinese Wall).  When different staff from different entities 
is handling the assignments, most of the interviewees indicated that each entity 
would act independently and perform ‘checks and balances’ on each other’s work. 
Therefore, the majority of the interviewees disclosed that it would act as a deterrent 
to auditors against compromising their independence.
Although the majority of the loan officers supported the notion that auditor 
independence would not be threatened if separate entities existed to perform these 
different services, it was discovered that most of the Malaysian bankers did not 
take into account the methods of provision of NAS to audit clients in their daily 
duties of loan processing as indicated in the above sub-section.  The interviews 
indicated that Malaysian auditors were currently performing a good job and 
producing reliable financial statements.  These loan officers may have come to hold 
this view due to a lack of disclosure of non-audit services in financial statements. 
Regarding the loan officer’s belief, a manager of a corporate loan department of a 
local bank revealed his experience in analysing corporate loan applications:
… as bankers, we don’t take into account whether there is a segregation 
of duties between audit and other services.  We accept the accounts as 
good, as long they are audited and there is a stamped, signed declaration 
by the auditor, that’s good enough for us.  It doesn’t matter whether they 
provide non-audit services to the company.
In addition, the interviews disclosed that the separation of entities is an effective 
way to minimise the auditor independence dilemma because audit partners in the 
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different entities do not have any direct interests, either financial or personal, that 
would cause them to compromise their objectivity.  A manager of a Big Four firm 
noted:
They do not directly share the same pool of revenue and profit.  Thus, 
each of them will protect their interest and professionalism and will 
conduct their business objectively.
A small minority of the interviewees who were opposed to the suggestion to 
separate the entities contended that staff from different entities that undertake audit 
and non-audit services still belong to the same organisation and will ultimately report 
to the same group of partners.  Their concern was focused on the willingness of 
partners within the same firm to expose the weaknesses, mistakes and wrongdoings 
of their colleague to the regulators or the public, hence, damaging the firm’s 
reputation.  A chief internal auditor of a public listed company pointed out:
All of them will report to the same partner, unless they have formalised 
some internal controls that are transparent to outsiders, which most of 
them claim that they have done; sure, they can say they have separate 
systems, they have separate reporting lines.  However, who checks all 
these claims? Nobody checks the auditors.  I don’t know who audits their 
accounts, or what the accounts look like.  Right now the disclosure of 
work is only on the clients’ annual reports, not on their part.  So when 
it comes to monitoring their independence, how do you do that?
Furthermore, the interviews revealed that users of financial statements might 
be misled by the different names under which both services were performed, when 
in actual fact the same person was running the firms.
Provision of NAS to Non-Audit Client and Total Prohibition
The majority of the respondents disagreed with the statement that auditor 
independence would be reduced if auditors were only allowed to provide non-
audit services to non-audit clients.  Although there is strong disagreement with the 
statement from the auditors (66%) and senior managers of public listed companies 
(88%), this is less than that expressed by the loan officers (99%), as shown in 
Table 4, and this might reflect the confidence of the loan officers in the safeguard 
to auditor independence created from the prohibition of provision of NAS to audit 
clients.  This result is consistent with Canning and Gwilliam (1999).  Teoh and 
Lim (1996) in Malaysia suggested that there is a need to restrict the provision of 
consulting services to non-audit clients.  The result might be a sign of the need for 
auditors to concentrate on their main function, to provide assurance as to the truth 
and fairness of clients’ accounts, and not involve themselves in providing non-audit 
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services to audit clients.  In addition, the responses shown by the majority of the 
respondents might reflect their belief that auditors should concentrate on providing 
one kind of service to their clients, either audit or non-audit services, as this would 
reduce the risk of conflict of interest (Canning and Gwilliam, 1999).
Opponents to the joint provision of audit and NAS have pointed out that 
auditors should be banned from providing NAS (e.g. Flint, 1988; Sherer and Kent, 
1983).  It was observed that the majority of the respondents disagreed with the 
statement that auditor independence would be reduced if auditors were prohibited 
from providing non-audit services.  Although there is strong disagreement from 
the auditors (61%) and senior managers of public listed companies (62%), this is 
less than that expressed by the loan officers (71%), as shown in Table 4, and this 
might reflect the loan officers’ concern with the potential drawbacks associated 
with the joint provision of audit and NAS to audit clients.
When the interviewees were asked about the issue of limiting the provision of 
NAS to non-audit clients or completely prohibiting auditors from providing NAS, 
all of them agreed that both approaches would safeguard auditor independence, 
which is consistent with the questionnaire survey findings.  Discussing the potential 
improvement to auditor independence, a director of a merchant bank remarked:
I think the scope would be less, if you ask me about impairment.   
I don’t see total elimination, I see less, the reason being because I think 
the business world today is based on networking and contacts, so it is 
more likely that the audit firm might actually introduce whatever tax 
consultant, financial consultant, at the end of the day I mean we hate to 
say this, but there might be a certain kick back, there might be certain 
other benefits derived somehow, somewhere.
However, the interviews disclosed that the prohibition would be too stringent 
for local accounting profession, where there are other possible alternatives 
to overcome auditor independence issues.  They indicated that the Malaysian 
accounting profession would severely resist this suggestion, due to the fact that 
fees from NAS could compliment their low incomes from audit fees, and pointed 
out that there is lack of financial services experts in Malaysian capital market to 
replace those audit firms.  A chief of an internal audit department of a public listed 
company remarked: 
If you look at the accounting firms, there are not many of them out 
there.  We hate to lose some of the good work done by the KPMG 
or PriceWaterHouse or Ernst and Young and others.  They are good 
consultants and also good at auditing statutory accounts.  If you prohibit 
the business altogether, you’ll lose that expertise and talent.  Why would 
we go and shoot ourselves in the foot?
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Therefore, the majority of the interviewees felt that these suggestions were 
not the best solutions to the problem faced by the profession.
Joint Provision of Audit and NAS with Full Disclosure in 
Client’s Financial Statement
As shown in Table 4, a sizeable percentage of the auditors (40%), loan officers 
(30%) and senior managers (42%) disagreed with the statement that auditor 
independence would be reduced if full disclosure on NAS were to be made in 
the clients’ financial statements, and this might reflect the confidence of the 
respondents in the potential benefits that disclosure on NAS might bring.
When interviewees were asked about what impact full disclosure in the client’s 
financial statement of the provision of NAS by auditors to audit clients would have 
on auditor independence, about half of the auditors (54%), loan officers (53%) senior 
managers of public listed companies (53%) and senior managers of regulatory 
bodies (59%) agreed that this approach would safeguard auditor independence, 
which is consistent with the questionnaire survey findings. 
The interviews disclosed that such disclosure could inform shareholders and 
regulators about auditors’ involvement in clients’ companies, and would trigger them 
to ask questions about the auditors’ relationship with management.  The interviews 
indicated that such disclosure would allow shareholders and the general public to 
assess the amount of money paid to the auditor and ask questions if they were not 
comfortable with the figures.  A partner of a medium size audit firm noted:
It will create awareness among the public, shareholders and 
stakeholders.  It also triggers them to ask question in the AGM, like 
‘Who is the auditor and consultant, and how will the management ensure 
there is a split of independency between the two?’ If we don’t have such 
disclosure, it is not fair to the public, who have a lack of knowledge on 
the operation side.
Some of the interviewees disclosed that many Malaysian investors did not care 
about accounting disclosure in financial statements, and were more concerned about 
the company’s profits and payment of dividends.  It was argued that a majority of 
small investors would not pay much attention to this type of disclosure.  A financial 
controller of a second board company described her experience as follows:
I have attended so many AGMs, and none of the shareholders ask 
questions.  They are not really interested in what the company does, 
and as long as the company pays dividend, they’ll keep quiet.  They 
don’t really try to understand the business of the company.  We don’t 
have people that stand up and ask questions like ‘why we are paying 
so much for consultancy?’
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This argument was further supported by a vice president of a listed company, 
who added:
I supposed it also depends on the type of shareholders that we have.  In 
general, Malaysian shareholders are still not aware of their rights, and 
do not question this issue during the AGM.  If the majority of shares are 
controlled either by a single entity or a family, the minority shareholders 
may not ask the company or director questions.
The interviews disclosed that Malaysian regulators should require the 
disclosure to include further details that outline the type of non-audit services 
provided, together with the amount of fees paid for the services and not only the 
total amount, as practiced currently.
Analysis of Mode of NAS Provision
An attempt was made to identify whether there exist significant differences in 
perceptions on mode of NAS provision using non-parametric tests (i.e. Friedman 
two-way ANOVA).  As shown in Table 5, the respondent’s perceptions on the 
mode of NAS provision are significantly different, where the NAS provision by 
audit personnel was found as the most threat to auditor independence in all groups 
(i.e. auditors, loan officers, senior managers of public listed companies and overall).
Table 5 Impact of method of provision of Non-audit Services (NAS) on 
perceived auditor independence
The independence of the auditor, for the  
purpose of audit, is reduced if NAS are
Mean Rank of the Friedman Two-Way Anova
Overall*
n=287
Auditor
N=93
Loan Officer
n=87
Manager
n=107 
provided to audit clients by personnel  
involved in audit
5.35 5.04 5.66 5.37
provided to audit clients by a separate  
department within the audit firm
3.65 3.71 3.87 3.41
provided to audit clients by a separate  
entity where the auditors have an interest
2.94 2.83 2.58 3.31
provided to non-audit clients only 2.51 3.02 2.17 2.34
not provided at all 2.90 2.87 2.80 3.01
provided by the auditor to all clients but  
full disclosure is made in the client  
financial statements
3.66 3.53 3.91 3.56
*χ²=561.326, p<0.0001
Note: The higher the mean rank, the more the respondents agreed with the statements. 
232
International Journal of Economics and Management
In Table 6, matched pairs of mode of NAS provision was made with the 
aim to identify whether significant differences exist in perceptions of auditor 
independence.  Using the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests; each methods 
of NAS provision were compared.  For example, the NAS provision by audit 
personnel was exclusively compared with the other five mode of NAS provision 
(i.e. separate department, separate entity, non-audit clients only, not provided at 
all, and full disclosure).  Based on the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests, 
the provision of NAS to audit clients by audit personnel was found as the most 
threat to auditor independence.
Table 6 Comparison of method of provision of Non-audit Services (NAS) 
and its impact to perceived auditor independence
Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Ranks Tests
Method of 
Provision of NAS
- Ranks
MR (Cases)
+ Ranks
MR (Cases)
Ties
(Cases) Test Results
B & A 106.44 (185) 114.24 (29) (73) z= -9.740;   p<0.0001*
C & A 105.50 (210) 0.00 (0) (77) z= -13.5869; p<0.0001*
D & A 142.89 (248) 18.00 (19) (20) z= -15.1920; p<0.0001*
E & A 127.63 (251) 47.50 (2) (34) z= -14.2475; p<0.0001*
F & A 117.84 (225) 73.50 (7) (55) z= -13.2041; p<0.0001*
C & B 93.25 (120) 85.0 (60) (107) z= -14.548; p<0.0001*
D & B 73.39 (133) 79.75 (14) (140) z= -8.644; p<0.0001*
E & B 94.66 (116) 53.13 (48) (123) z= -7.163;   p<0.0001*
F & B 116.11 (93) 79.23 (100) (94) z= -1.917;   p<0.0001*
D & C 54.57 (66) 28.50 (27) (194) z= -5.6235;   p<0.0001*
E & C 85.45 (66) 54.88 (72) (149) z= -1.8991;   p=0.0575*
F & C 95.50 (29) 67.38 (116) (142) z= -5.4307;   p<0.0001*
E & D 54.00 (31) 56.78 (80) (176) z= -4.7802;   p<0.0001*
F & D 106.70 (28) 94.16 (163) (96) z= -8.6361;   p<0.0001*
F & E 69.50 (41) 85.57 (121) (125) z= -6.8213;   p<0.0001*
A: NAS provided by audit personnel; B: NAS provided by a separate department; C: NAS provided by a separate 
entity; D: NAS provided to non-audit clients only; E: NAS not provided at all; F: NAS provided but full disclosure.
*  Two tailed probability; MR=Mean Rank
-Ranks: Respondents agreed less that independence would be threatened if the first rather than the second method of 
NAS provision were adopted.
+ Ranks: Respondents agreed more that independence would be threatened if the first rather than the second method 
of NAS provision were adopted.
Type of NAS
This section examines the impact on auditor independence based on different types 
of NAS to audit client.  The main focus is to identify the different kinds of NAS 
potentially affect auditor independence in different ways or perhaps some of the 
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NAS may not give any impact at all.  As shown in Table 7, Fifteen (15) types of 
non-audit services were examined. 
As reported in Table 7, the mean distribution of the overall sample indicate 
that the provision of accounting/bookkeeping, internal audit, asset valuations, 
financial information system design and treasury management services as the top 
5 services that may affect auditor independence if those services are provided by 
auditor to audit client.6  On the other hand, the overall respondents consider the 
stock exchange circulars, secretarial, due diligence, management training and human 
resources services would not undermine auditor independence. 
This result suggested that recurring services like accounting/bookkeeping 
and internal audit, and non-recurring services such as asset valuations, financial 
information design and treasury management services were considered as a threat 
to auditor independence, which is not consistent with Beck, Frecka et al. (1988a) 
and  Parkash and Venable (1993) findings.  They posited that recurring services 
provide continuous rents to the auditor that can result in a perception of impaired 
independence, and conversely, bonding effects of non-recurring services would be 
minimal to non-existent.  This clear dividing line between the effect of recurring 
and non-recurring was not supported in this study.
Responses from auditors show that only 3 NAS were considered as a threat 
to auditor independence namely accounting/bookkeeping, internal audit services 
and management functions.  However, loan officers did not consider management 
functions services could undermine auditor independence; instead they believe that 
asset valuation, financial information systems design and implementation, treasury 
management services, corporate finance services, and accountant’s report and 
review on profit forecast for Initial Public Offering Company as a threat to auditor 
independence.  Consistent with loan officers, the managers are more stringent in their 
evaluation of type of NAS by adding additional services that may threaten auditor 
independence namely tax planning and compliance services, management functions 
and secretarial services.  The variability of responses among the respondents’ groups 
is clearly evident, where 14 out of 15 NAS were significantly different among the 
respondent’s group implying that exist inconsistent opinion.  Moreover, 13 of the 
14 NAS are significant at 1% level (using the Kruskal Wallis test). 
Majority of the loan officers (94 percent) and managers (82 percent) 
interviewed agree with the suggestion to adopt the rule to ban the provision of 
selected type of NAS to audit client as provided by the Sarbanes Oxley Act and 
the US’s SEC rule, where they believe that this kind of prohibition would enhance 
auditor independence.  Only 5 of the auditors agreed with the suggestion.  Most of 
the interviewees that agreed with the suggestion reckon that the prohibition should 
be on selective basis.  Majority of the interviewees reckoned that any adoption or 
6 Mean distribution greater than 2.00 indicate that the respective NAS will undermine auditor 
independence if it is provided by auditor to audit client, while mean distribution lower than 2.00 indicate 
that the respective NAS will not undermine auditor independence.
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enactment of law should be tailored to the local business environment.  Perhaps, 
the lawmaker should seriously examine the impact of the suggested regulation to 
different type of companies like companies with high/low ownership concentration. 
This unique nature of Malaysian capital market is crucial to be considered before 
any new law being implemented. 
Some of the loan officers believe that regulators should ban the auditor from 
providing merger, acquisition and due diligence services, while they believe that 
the provision of tax, recruitment and review of profit forecast services would not 
undermine auditor independence.  However, the managers interviewed showed a 
different attitude, which is well summarised by a chief internal audit of a main 
board companies:
Perhaps, the provision of due diligence should not be a problem, 
while book keeping or anything to do with system improvement should 
be restricted.  In one hand, they perform the services to satisfy their 
client expectation, and on the other hand, they going to audit it, and 
surely they won’t criticise their own work.  However, the provision of 
due diligence is more like exercising their professional judgement.  I 
supposed anything to do with the company itself should not be provided 
by the company’s auditor.
The information gathered from the questionnaires and interviews indicate 
that the majority of the participants consider the provision of NAS that involves 
financial services is inconsistent with auditor independence and should be banned. 
Moreover, consistent with loan officers and managers, a big four’s audit manager 
felt that more efforts are needed to educate client and auditor should be in place:
I don’t disagree to the suggestion to prohibit auditor from providing 
non-audit service to their client, but the most important is that we have 
to educate both the client and the audit firm.  If the client knows that 
consultancy job would create future problem, I believed they will award 
the job to the other firms and audit firm got no choice. 
Sixty-two percent of the auditors interviewed disagree on the suggestion to 
adopt the rule to prohibit auditor providing selected type of non-audit services to 
their audit client.  They believe that Malaysian auditors are aware on their ethical 
and professional standards, which would deter them from committing irregular 
practices or any wrongdoings.  A partner of a medium size audit firms noted:
…the law will make no different … we don’t always try to help client 
to do nonsense.  We still professional but we guide them to do the right 
thing, not so much just because I got few consultancy job with the client, 
then I’ll guide them to do the wrong thing.
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CONCLUSION
This study investigates the perceptions of Malaysian auditors, loan officers and 
senior managers of public listed companies on the effect of joint provision of audit 
and non-audit services on auditor independence.  The majority of the respondents 
agreed that the provision of NAS to audit clients by the audit engagement team 
would threaten independence.  Perhaps, this might indicate the respondents’ 
concern about the ability of auditors to independently act as a watchdog to assure 
the truth and fairness of clients’ accounts, and at the same time to perform their 
NAS duties to advise and consult with the client.  The main concern indicated by 
the interviewees was with the ability of the auditors to behave independently due 
to their dependence on income from both services.  Also, there would be a lack 
of ‘checks and balances’ if both duties were to be performed by the same person. 
The Friedman two-way ANOVA and Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks tests 
indicate that the joint provision of audit and NAS to audit clients by audit staff as 
the most threat to auditor independence.
On the other hand, the majority of the respondents agreed that auditor 
independence would not be threatened if the provision of audit and NAS were to 
be provided by staff from a separate department and entity.  The result indicates 
that the respondents had faith in the segregation of duties or ‘Chinese Wall’ offered 
by these approaches.  Though the departments and entities are under the same 
ultimate control or belong to the same firm, the level of communication between 
both parties is minimal, because each of them is responsible for the operation of 
their own department/entity.  Consistently, the interviews indicated that auditor 
independence would not be threatened if staff from separate departments or entities 
were to provide audit and NAS.  It was mentioned that these modes of provision of 
NAS would allow segregation of duties, which would result in greater monitoring 
activities.  Despite the consistent view among the respondents, it was pointed out that 
the loan officers did not consider the method of provision of NAS as an important 
issue in their daily duties of loan processing because they believed that the auditors 
were currently doing a good job and producing reliable financial statements.
In addition, the majority of the respondents indicated their agreement that the 
threat to auditor independence would be less if the provision of audit and NAS 
were limited to non-audit clients or if it was completely prohibited for auditors to 
provide joint services,  consistent with the interview survey findings.  However, 
these approaches are indicated to be too stringent and would be severely resisted 
by the profession because income from NAS complements the low income 
derived from audit services for some audit firms.  The results suggest that auditors 
should concentrate on one type of service: either auditing or NAS.  Through 
concentrating on audit or non-audit services, the risk of conflict of interest could be 
reduced or eliminated.  Finally, the majority of the respondents agreed that auditor 
independence would be safeguarded if auditors were to provide full disclosure in 
client accounts following the provision of NAS.  In interview survey, it was revealed 
237
Commercialization of Accounting Profession: The Case of Non-audit Services
that such disclosure could inform shareholders and regulators about the auditor’s 
relationship with the company, while some of the interviewees contended that the 
Malaysian investors did not care about accounting disclosure because they were 
more concerned about the company’s profits and payment of dividends.  The result 
might suggest that the users become aware of the level of relationship between 
auditors and clients’ management, and could question both parties on any issues 
about which they need further clarification during the annual general meeting.
The majority of interviewees support the suggestion to ban selected type of 
NAS to be provided by auditor their audit client.  On average, the respondents 
consider the provision of accounting/bookkeeping, internal audit, asset valuations, 
financial information system design and treasury management service is not 
consistent with auditor independence.  Finally, it is found that auditors are protective 
to the criticisms on their profession, which is consistent with Teoh and Lim (1995) 
findings.  While the other group of respondents’ applied a more rigid critics and 
suggestions on the perceptions of auditor independence.
Based on the findings in this study, it is recommended that the best alternative 
to prohibiting audit firms from providing NAS is a proper segregation of duties 
between staff that perform audit services and NAS.  This segregation of duties 
should be in the form of separate departments or entities, where different partners 
and team provide the two services.  Audit partners should not be involved, directly 
or indirectly, in the provision of NAS or even in the marketing of these services. 
In order to monitor this practice, each audit firm and its NAS arm should lodge its 
organisation profile, which should clearly state the identities of the audit team and 
the NAS team, with the MIA. 
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